Check Point's latest firewall innovation brings the industry's strongest URL Filtering, application and identity control to organizations of all sizes. You can easily create policies which detect or block thousands of applications and internet sites.
Use the Application Control and URL Filtering blades to:
URL Filtering Categorization Flow 
FeaturesFeature - HTTPS FilteringCategorization of HTTPS sites without HTTPS inspection (passive HTTPS). Supports URL Filtering on HTTPS traffic without HTTPS inspection.To enable it, enable the URL Filtering blade: Go to Application & URL Filtering tab -> Advanced -> Engine Settings -> Enable "Categorize HTTPS sites" and install Security policy How it works A cache table cptls_server_cn_cache is used here. The cache saves mapping between IP+Port to CN (certificate's Canonical Name) and a flag if the CN is valid.  When SSL traffic is coming, the request (client hello) is recognized by PM (Pattern Matcher) matching on one of SSL request signatures internal procedure. Then the IP+Port will be extracted from the connection and will be searched in the cptls cache and a CN (certificate's Canonical Name) might be found. If a CN is found and valid, it will be sent to RAD (Resource ADvisor - internal engine responsible for URL Filtering) and the traffic will be categorized according to it. Otherwise, the traffic is continued to be inspected. When a response (server hello) is coming, it is recognized by PM (Pattern Matcher) matching on one of SSL response signatures internal procedure, the certificate will be extracted and sent to WSTLS process in User mode (in one or more traps). The process will try to resolve the certificate and find its CN. It will return an asynchronic ioctl with response to the kernel with the IP+Port and the CN (if found). If a CN is returned, it will be sent to RAD and will be categorized according to it. Otherwise, the IP address will be sent to RAD and will be categorized according to it. Example: if the certificate's CN is google.com, the categories will be "search engine/portal" Debugging & Troubleshooting Run the following debug on the Security Gateway:
Troubleshooting:
Feature - Safe SearchSafe Search feature in web browsers is designed to screen sites that contain sexually explicit content and remove them from the search results. While no filter is 100% accurate, Safe Search helps to avoid content you may prefer not to see or would rather your children did not stumble across.User can change the settings of Safe Search from the browser for each specific search engine. This feature supports Safe Search in search engines (currently Google, Bing and Yahoo). To enable it, enable the URL Filtering blade. Go to Application & URL Filtering tab -> Advanced -> Engine Settings -> Enable "Enforce Safe Search in search engines" and install Security policy How it works Each search engine has its saved "&meter=value" that is added to the URL when 'Safe search' feature is enabled or disabled. For example, when enabling Safe Search engine in Google, it adds "&safe=active" to the URL. And when disabling it, it adds "&safe=off" to the URL. Debugging & Troubleshooting Run the following debug on the Security Gateway:
Problem: Safe Search feature is not working. Troubleshooting:
Feature - Cached and Translated pages categorizationWith this feature disabled, when a user access the cached pages or Google translated pages, the matched category is ‘Search Engine’ since we drop the query string and send to RAD (Resource ADvisor) the Search Engine domain only.For example, when accessing http://www.ynet.co.il cached page from Google, the URL looks like: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?ix=seb&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=cache%3Awww.ynet.co.il. The category will be the category of "webcache.googleusercontent.com" (Search Engine). This feature extracts the correct domain from the cached / Google translated URL buffer, sends it to RAD and then gets the exact category of the page. To enable it, enable the URL Filtering blade. Go to Application & URL Filtering tab -> Advanced -> Engine Settings -> Enable "Enforce Safe Search in search engines" and install Security policy How it works The signatures are compiled to one PM (Pattern Matcher) that recognizes URLs that try to access the cached/translated pages. When a URL is coming, the PM matching (built from the relevant signatures of this feature) is executed against it. If there is a match on one of the signatures, it means that it is cached or translated page. According to the signature match offset, the host is extracted and sent to RAD and the client will get the correct category of the page. Debugging & Troubleshooting Run the following debug on the Security Gateway:
Troubleshooting:
URL Filtering AgentGeneral DescriptionThe new URL Filtering software blade uses a hosted categorization service (cloud-based categorization) that is being constantly updated to cope with the dynamic nature of the web. The Security Gateway is not required to download updates, the categorization database is not limited by the storage space on the Security Gateway, and customers receive the latest categorization to keep policies current.As requests are being sent to the cloud, responses are being cached locally on the Security Gateway so that subsequent requests for the same sites will not query the cloud, but will be answered by the local cache. In deployments of R75.20 URL Filtering, we have seen that more than 99% of requests are being met by the cache, providing customers with the most up-to-date categorization (with the cloud) on the one hand and minimal latency (as most requests are being met by the cache), on the other. When there are critical updates, for example, a previously benign site has been hacked and is now used to spread malware, the cache is invalidated and forced to retrieve updates from the cloud. ProcessesThe R75.20 URL Filtering blade uses a single user mode process called RAD ($FWDIR/bin/rad) to communicate with the online URL Filtering service. The process is initiated once application control, or URL filtering blades, are active on the Security Gateway. Whenever RAD successfully categorizes a URL, it caches it in its kernel cache.The URL Filtering kernel cache holds the entire URL Family (i.e. all the URLs within the same host). Whenever there is a request for a new URL categorization, RAD sends to the online categorization service only the host part of the URL and receives the entire URL family. The response is then cached for future use. Important FilesRAD holds its configuration in 3 files:
URL Filtering Updates and local database (LDB) filesThe RAD kernel cache holds the entire URL Family. Whenever there is a request for a new URL categorization, RAD sends to the online categorization service only the host part of the URL and receives the entire URL family. To keep the response size short, the online service answers only if the URL family has 100 or less members. 99% of the URL database are part of families with 100 or less members and can be retrieved using the online service. The remaining 1% of the database is aggregated in a special file: $FWDIR/appi/update/urlf_db.binThe file is reloaded on each URL Filtering update. Before sending a new online categorization request to the service, RAD looks in the local LDB file for a match. Only if the URL does not exist in the file, a request to the service is made. To trigger a reload of the LDB file: rad_admin urlf update $FWDIR/appi/update/urlf_db.bin Website categorization modeYou can select the mode that is used for web site categorization:
RAD CLI
Main Debug Flags
|
Thursday, January 31, 2019
ATRG: URL Filtering
R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Logical Packet Flow)
R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Logical Packet Flow)
| Introduction |
|---|
| Chapter |
|---|
R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Logical Packet Flow)
R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Content Inspection)
R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Acceleration Card Offloading)
R80.x Ports Used for Communication by Various Check Point Modules
Performance Tuning:
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip - AES-NI
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip - SMT (Hyper Threading)
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip - Multi Queue
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip - Connection Table
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip - fw monitor
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip - TCPDUMP vs. CPPCAP
R80.x Performance Tuning Tip – DDoS „fw sam“ vs. „fwaccel dos“
Cheat Sheet:
R80.x update cheat sheet - fw monitor
| What's new in R80.10 and above |
|---|
- new fw monitor inspection points for VPN (e and E)
- new MultiCore VPN
- UP Manager
- Content Awareness (CTNT)
R80.20 and above:
- SecureXL has been significantly revised in R80.20. It now works in user space. This has also led to some changes in "fw monitor"
- There are new fw monitor chain (SecureXL) objects that do not run in the virtual machine.
- Now SecureXL works in user space. The SecureXL driver takes a certain amount of kernel memory per core and that was adding up to more kernel memory than Intel/Linux was allowing.
- SecureXL supportes now Async SecureXL with Falcon cards
- That's new in acceleration high level architecture (SecureXL on Acceleration Card): Streaming over SecureXL, Lite Parsers, Scalable SecureXL, Acceleration stickiness
- Policy push acceleration on Falcon cards
- Falcon cards for: Low Latency, High Connections Rate, SSL Boost, Deep Inspection Acceleration, Modular Connectivity, Multible Acceleration modules
- Falcon card compatible with 5900, 15000 & 23000 Appliance Series > 1G (8x1 GbE), 10G (4x10 GbE) and 40G (2x40 GbE)
| Flowchart |
|---|
| Download PDF's |
|---|
You can download this flowchart as PDF here:
Download this PDF - Flowchart - version 1.2a
| VPN |
|---|
R80.10 and R80.20 introduced MultiCore support (it is new in R80 and above) for IPsec VPN. An IPSec packet enters the Security Gateway. The decrypted original packet is forwarded to the connection CoreXL FW instance for FireWall inspection at Pre-Inbound chain "i" from SND. The decrypted inspected packet is sent to the OS Kernel.
Encryption information is prepared at Post-Outbound chain "O". The vpnk module on the tunnel CoreXL FW instance gets the packet before encryption at chain "e". The encryption packet is forwarded to the connection CoreXL FW instance for FireWall from SND. The packet is encrypted by vpnk module at chain "E". Afterwards the IPsec packet is sent out on interface. This fw monitor inspection points "e" and "E" are new in R80.10 and "oe" and "OE" are new in R80.20.
Note: It's true, they only exist on the outbound side for encrypting packets not for decrypting packets on inbound side.
F2V - Describes VPN Connections via the F2F path.
| Firewall Core |
|---|
The firewall does preliminary “stateless” checks that do not require context in order to decide whether to accept a packet or not. For instance we check that the packet is a valid packet and if the header is compliant with RFC standards.
Anti-Spoofing verifies that the source IP of each packet matches the interface, on which it was encountered. On internal interfaces we only allow packets whose source IP is within the user-defined network topology. On the external interface we allow all source IPs except for ones that belong to internal networks.
A core component of the Check Point R80.x Threat Prevention gateway is the stateful inspection firewall. A stateful firewall tracks the state of network connections in memory to identify other packets belonging to the same connection and to dynamically open connections that belong to the same session. Allowing FTP data connections using the information in the control connection is one such example. Using Check Point INSPECT code the firewall is able to dynamically recognize that the FTP control connection is opening a separate data connection to transfer data. When the client requests that the server generate the back-connection (an FTP PORT command), INSPECT code extracts the port number from the request. Both client and server IP addresses and both port numbers are recorded in an FTP-data pending request list. When the FTP data connection is attempted, the firewall examines the list and verifies that the attempt is in response to a valid request. The list of connections is maintained dynamically, so that only the required FTP ports are opened.
| SecureXL |
|---|
- SAM cards on Check Point 21000 appliances
- ADP cards on IP Series appliances
- Falcon cards (new in R80.20) on different appliances
In R80.10 SecureXL adds support for Domain Objects, Dynamic Objects and Time Objects. CoreXL accelerates VPN traffic by distributing Next Generation Threat Prevention inspection across multiple cores.
New in R80.20:
SecureXL was significantly revised in R80.20. It no longer works in Linux kernel mode but now in user space. In kernel mode resources (for example memory) are very limited. This has the advantage that more resources can be used in user space.The SecureXL driver takes a certain amount of kernel memory per core and that was adding up to more kernel memory than Intel/Linux was allowing. On the 23900 in particular, we could not leverage all the processor cores due to this limitation. By moving all or most of SecureXL to user space, it's possible to leverage more processor cores as the firewall can entirely run in user space.It still doesn't by default in R80.20 in non-VSX mode, but it can be enabled.
It also means certain kinds of low-level packet processing that could not easily be done in SecureXL because it was being done in the kernel now can. For VSX in particular, it means you can now configure the penalty box features on a per-VS basis. It also improves session establishment rates on the higher-end appliances.
In addition, the following functions have been integrated in R80.20 SecureXL:
- SecureXL on Acceleration Cards (AC)
- Streaming over SecureXL
- Lite Parsers
- Async SecureXL
- Scalable SecureXL
- Acceleration stickiness
- Policy push acceleration
Throughput Acceleration - The first packets of a new TCP connection require more processing when processed by the firewall module. If the connection is eligible for acceleration, after minimal security processing the packet is offloaded to the SecureXL device associated with the proper egress interface. Subsequent packets of the connection can be processed on the accelerated path and directly sent from the inbound to the outbound interface via the SecureXL device.
SecureXL and the firewall module keep their own state tables and communicate updates to each other.
- Connection notification - SecureXL passes the relevant information about accelerated connections that match an accept template.
- Connection offload - Firewall kernel passes the relevant information about the connection from firewall connections table to SecureXL connections table.
If templating is used under SecureXL, the templates are created when the firewall ruleset is installed.
Accept Tamplate is enabled by default if SecureXL is used.
Drop Template is disabled by default if SecureXL is used. It can be activated via smart Dashboard and does not require a reboot of the firewall.
R80.10 and lower: NAT Template is disabled by default.
R80.20 and above: NAT Template is enabled by design.
Note: In many discusions and images, the SXL path is marked with the "accelerated path". This also happened to me by mistake in this flowchart.
- IPS (some protections)
- VPN (in some configurations)
- Application Control
- Content Awareness
- Anti-Virus
- Anti-Bot
- HTTPS Inspection
- Proxy mode
- Mobile Access
- VoIP
- Web Portals.
Inline Streaming path, Medium Streaming path, Host path and Buffer path - Are new SecureXL paths used in conjunction with Falcon cards. They are described in more detail in the following article "R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Acceleration Card Offloading) ".
| SecureXL chain modules (new in R80.20 and above) |
|---|
There are new fw monitor chain (SecureXL) objects that do not run in the virtual machine.
SecureXL inbound (sxl_in) > Packet received in SecureXL from network
SecureXL inbound CT (sxl_ct) > Accelerated packets moved from inbound to outbound processing (post routing)
SecureXL outbound (sxl_out) > Accelerated packet starts outbound processing
SecureXL deliver (sxl_deliver) > SecureXL transmits accelerated packet
vpn before offload (vpn_in) > FW inbound preparing the tunnel for offloading the packet (along with the connection)
fw offload inbound (offload_in) > FW inbound that perform the offload
fw post VM inbound (post_vm) > Packet was not offloaded (slow path) - continue processing in FW inbound
| CoreXL |
|---|
CoreXL is a performance-enhancing technology for Security Gateways on multi-CPU-core processing platforms. CoreXL enhances Security Gateway performance by enabling the processing CPU cores to concurrently perform multiple tasks. CoreXL provides almost linear scalability of performance, according to the number of processing CPU cores on a single machine. The increase in performance is achieved without requiring any changes to management or to network topology.
On a Security Gateway with CoreXL enabled, the Firewall kernel is replicated multiple times. Each replicated copy, or FW instance, runs on one processing CPU core. These FW instances handle traffic concurrently, and each FW instance is a complete and independent FW inspection kernel. When CoreXL is enabled, all the FW kernel instances in the Security Gateway process traffic through the same interfaces and apply the same security policy.
Secure Network Distributor (SND) - Traffic entering network interface cards (NICs) is directed to a processing CPU core running the SND, which is responsible for:
- Processing incoming traffic from the network interfaces
- Securely accelerating authorized packets (if SecureXL is enabled)
- Distributing non-accelerated packets among Firewall kernel instances (SND maintains global dispatching table - which connection was assigned to which instance)
SND does not really touch any packet. The decision to stick to a particular FWK core is done at the first packet of connection on a very high level before anything else. Depending on SXL settings and in most of the cases, SXL can be offloading decryption calculations. However, in some other cases, such as with Route-Based VPN, it is done by FWK.
for each CoreXL FW instance is calculated according to its CPU utilization. The higher the CPU utilization, the higher the CoreXL FW instance's rank is, hence this CoreXL FW instance is less likely to be selected by the CoreXL SND. The CoreXL Dynamic Dispatcher allows for better load distribution and helps mitigate connectivity issues during traffic "peaks", as connections opened at a high rate that would have been assigned to the same CoreXL FW instance by a static decision, will now be distributed to several CoreXL FW instances.
Multi Queue - Network interfaces on a security gateway typically receive traffic at different throughputs; some are busier than others. At a low level, when a packet is received from the NIC, then a CPU core must be “interrupted” to the exclusion of all other processes, in order to receive the packet for processing. To avoid bottlenecks we allow multiple buffers, and therefore CPU cores, to be affined to an interface. Each affined buffer can “interrupt” its own CPU core allowing high volumes of inbound packets to be shared across multiple dispatchers.
When most of the traffic is accelerated by the SecureXL, the CPU load from the CoreXLSND instances can be very high, while the CPU load from the CoreXL FW instances can be very low. This is an inefficient utilization of CPU capacity. By default, the number of CPU cores allocated to CoreXL SND instances is limited by the number of network interfaces that handle the traffic. Because each interface has one traffic queue, only one CPU core can handle each traffic queue at a time. This means that each CoreXL SND instance can use only one CPU core at a time for each network interface. Check Point Multi-Queue lets you configure more than one traffic queue for each network interface. For each interface, you can use more than one CPU core (that runs CoreXL SND) for traffic acceleration. This balances the load efficiently between the CPU cores that run the CoreXL SND instances and the CPU cores that run CoreXL FW instances.
Priority Queues - In some situations a security gateway can be overwhelmed; in circumstances where traffic levels exceed the capabilities of the hardware, either legitimate traffic or from a DOS attack, it is vital that we can maintain management communications and continue to interact with dynamic routing neighbors. The Priority Queues functionality prioritizes control connections over data connections based on priority.
Affinity - Association of a particular network interface / FW kernel instance / daemon with a CPU core (either 'Automatic' (default), or 'Manual'). The default CoreXL interface affinity setting for all interfaces is 'Automatic' when SecureXL is installed and enabled. If SecureXL is enabled - the default affinities of all interfaces are 'Automatic' - the affinity for each interface is automatically reset every 60 seconds, and balanced between available CPU cores based on the current load. If SecureXL is disabled - the default affinities of all interfaces are with available CPU cores - those CPU cores that are not running a CoreXL FW instance or not defined as the affinity for a daemon.
The association of a particular interface with a specific processing CPU core is called the interface's affinity with that CPU core. This affinity causes the interface's traffic to be directed to that CPU core and the CoreXL SND to run on that CPU core. The association of a particular CoreXL FW instance with a specific CPU core is called the CoreXL FW instance's affinity with that CPU core. The association of a particular user space process with a specific CPU core is called the process's affinity with that CPU core. The default affinity setting for all interfaces is Automatic. Automatic affinity means that if SecureXL is enabled, the affinity for each interface is reset periodically and balanced between the available CPU cores. If SecureXL is disabled, the default affinities of all interfaces are with one available CPU core. In both cases, all processing CPU cores that run a CoreXL FW instance, or defined as the affinity for another user space process, is considered unavailable, and the affinity for interfaces is not set to those CPU cores.| Version | Check Point Appliance | Open Server |
| R80.10 (Gaia 32-bit) | 16 | 16 |
| R80.10 (Gaia 64-bit) | 40 | 40 |
| R77.30 (Gaia 32-bit) | 16 | 16 |
| R77.30 (Gaia 64-bit) | 32 | 32 |
| FW Monitor Inspection Points |
|---|
There are six fw monitor inspection points when a packet passes through a R80.x Security Gateway:
| Inspection point | Name of fw monitor inspection point | Relation to firewall VM | Available since version |
|---|---|---|---|
| i | Pre-Inbound | Before the inbound FireWall VM (for example, eth1:i) | always |
| I | Post-Inbound | After the inbound FireWall VM (for example, eth1:I) | always |
| id | Pre-Inbound VPN | Inbound before decrypt (for example, eth1:id) | R80.20 |
| iD | Post-Inbound VPN | Inbound after decrypt (for example, eth1:ID) | R80.20 |
| iq | Pre-Inbound QoS | Inbound before QoS (for example, eth1:iq) | R80.20 |
| iQ | Post-Inbound QoS | Inbound after QoS (for example, eth1:IQ) | R80.20 |
| o | Pre-Outbound | Before the outbound FireWall VM (for example, eth1:o) | always |
| O | Post-Outbound | After the outbound FireWall VM (for example, eth1:O) | always |
| e oe | Pre-Outbound VPN | Outbound before encrypt (for example, eth1:e) in R80.10(for example, eth1:oe) in R80.20 | R80.10 R80.20 |
| E OE | Post-Outbound VPN | Outbound after encrypt (for example, eth1:E) in R80.10(for example, eth1:OE) in R80.20 | R80.10 R80.20 |
| oq | Pre-Outbound QoS | Outbound before QoS (for example, eth1:oq) | R80.20 |
| oQ | Post-Outbound QoS | Outbound after QoS (for example, eth1:OQ) | R80.20 |
The "Pre-Encrypt" fw monitor inspection point (e) and the "Post-Encrypt" fw monitor inspection point (E) are new in R80 and above.
Note: It's true, they only exist on the outbound side for encrypting packets not for decrypting packets on inbound side.In Firewall kernel (now also SecureXL), each kernel is associated with a key witch specifies the type of traffic applicable to the chain modul.
| Key | Function |
|---|---|
| ffffffff | IP Option Stip/Restore |
| 00000001 | new processed flows |
| 00000002 | wire mode |
| 00000003 | will applied to all ciphered traffic (VPN) |
| 00000000 | SecureXL offloading (new in R80.20+) |
| Content Inspection |
|---|
Session-based processing enforces advanced access control and threat detection and prevention capabilities. To do this we assemble packets into a stream, parse the stream for relevant contexts and then security modules inspect the content. When possible, a common pattern matcher does simultaneous inspection of the content for multiple security modules. In multi-core systems this processing is distributed amongst the cores to provide near linear scalability on each additional core.
Passive Streaming Library (PSL) -Packets may arrive out of order or may be legitimate retransmissions of packets that have not yet received an acknowledgment. In some cases a retransmission may also be a deliberate attempt to evade IPS detection by sending the malicious payload in the retransmission. Security Gateway ensures that only valid packets are allowed to proceed to destinations. It does this with Passive Streaming Library (PSL) technology.
- PSL is an infrastructure layer, which provides stream reassembly for TCP connections.
- The gateway makes sure that TCP data seen by the destination system is the same as seen by code above PSL.
This layer handles packet reordering, congestion handling and is responsible for various security aspects of the TCP layer such as handling payload overlaps, some DoS attacks and others. - The PSL layer is capable of receiving packets from the firewall chain and from SecureXL module.
- The PSL layer serves as a middleman between the various security applications and the network packets. It provides the applications with a coherent stream of data to work with, free of various network problems or attacks
- The PSL infrastructure is wrapped with well defined APIs called the Unified Streaming APIs which are used by the applications to register and access streamed data.
Protocol Parsers -
The Protocol Parsers main functions are to ensure compliance to well-defined protocol standards, detect anomalies if any exist, and assemble the data for further inspection by other components of the IPS engine. They include HTTP, SMTP, DNS, IMAP, Citrix, and many others. In a way, protocol parsers are the heart of the IPS system. They register themselves with the streaming engine (usually PSL), get the streamed data, and dissect the protocol.The protocol parsers can analyze the protocols on both Client to Server (C2S) and Server to Client (S2C) directions. The outcome of the protocol parsers are contexts. A context is a well defined part of the protocol, on which further security analysis can be made. Examples of such contexts are HTTP URL, FTP command, FTP file name, HTTP response, and certain files.
CMI separates parsers and protections. Protection is a set of signatures or/and handlers, where
- Signature - a malicious pattern that is searched for
- Handler - INSPECT code that performs more complex inspection
- Activation status of the protection (Prevent, Detect, Inactive)
- Exceptions either on traffic or on protection
- Bypass mode status (the software fail open capability)
- Troubleshooting mode status
- Are we protecting the internal network only or all traffic
- Pattern Matcher quickly identifies harmless packets, common signatures inmalicious packets, and does a second level analysis to reduce false positives.
- Pattern Matcher engine provides the ability to find regular expressions on a stream of data using a two tiered inspection process.
UP Manager - The UP Manager controls all interactions of the components and interfaces with the Context Management Infrastructure (CMI) Loader, the traffic director of the CMI. The UP Manager also has a list of Classifiers that have registered for “first packets” and uses a bitmap to instruct the UP Classifier to execute these Classifier Apps to run on the packet. The “first packets” arrive directly from the CMI. Parsing of the protocol and streaming are not needed in this stage of the connection. For “first packets” the UP Manager executes the rule base.
In some cases Classifier Apps do not require streaming, e.g. the first packet information is sufficient. Then the rule base decision can be done on the first packet.
- Dynamic Objects
- Domain Objects
- Only the firewall is enabled
On subsequent packets the Classifier can be contacted directly from the CMI using the CMI Loader infrastructure, e.g. when the Pattern Matcher has found a match it informs the CMI it has found application xyz. The CMI Loader passes this information to the Classifier. The Classifier runs the Classification Apps to generate CLOBs required for Application Control and sends the CLOBs to the Observer.
Observer - The Observer decides if enough information is known to publish a CLOB to the security policy. CLOBs are observed in the context of their transaction and the connection that the transaction belongs to. The Observer may request more CLOBs for a dedicated packet from the Classifier or decides that it has sufficient information about the packet to execute the rule base on the CLOB, e.g. if a file type is needed for Content Awareness and the gateway hasn’t yet received the S2C response containing the file. Executing the rule base on a CLOB is called “publishing a CLOB”. The Observer may wait to receive more CLOBs that belong to the same transaction before publishing the CLOBs.
Security Policy - The Security Policy receives the CLOB published by the Observer. The CLOB includes a description of the Blade it belongs to so that matching can be performed on a column basis. The security policy saves the current state on the transaction Handle; either to continue the inspection or final match.
The first packets are received directly from the UP Manager. Subsequent packets are received by the rule base from the Observer.
Handle - Each connection may consist of several transactions. Each transaction has a Handle. Each Handle contains a list of published CLOBs. The Handle holds the state of the security policy matching process. The Handle infrastructure component stores the rule base matching state related information.
Subsequent Packets - Subsequent packets are handled by the streaming engine. The streaming engine notifies the Classifier to perform the classification. The Classifier will notify the UP Manager about the performed classification and pass the CLOBs to the Observer. The CLOBs will then be received by the Observer that will need to wait for information from the CMI. The CMI sends the information describing the result of the Protocol Parser and the Pattern Matcher to the Classifier. The Classifier informs the UP Manager and sends the CLOB to the Observer. The UP Manager then instructs the Observer to publish the CLOBs to the Rule Base.
The Rule Base is executed on the CLOBs and the result is communicated to the UP Manager. The CLOBs and related Rule Base state are stored in the Handle. The UP Manager provides the result of the rule base check to the CMI that then decides to allow or to drop the connection. The CMI generates a log message and instructs the streaming engine to forward the packets to the outbound interface.
Content Awareness (CTNT) - is a new blade introduced in R80.10 as part of the new Unified Access Control Policy. Using Content Awareness blade as part of Firewall policy allows the administrator to enforce the Security Policy based on the content of the traffic by identifying files and its content. Content Awareness restricts the Data Types that users can upload or download.
Content Awareness can be used together with Application Control to enforce more interesting scenarios (e.g. identify which files are uploaded to DropBox).
Content Awareness can be used together with Application Control to enforce more interesting scenarios (e.g. identify which files are uploaded to DropBox).
| References |
|---|
SecureKnowledge: NAT Templates
SecureKnowledge: VPN Core
SecureKnowledge: CoreXL
SecureKnowledge: CoreXL Dynamic Dispatcher in R77.30 / R80.10 and above
SecureKnowledge: Application Control
SecureKnowledge: URL Filtering
SecureKnowledge: Content Awareness (CTNT)
SecureKnowledge: IPS
SecureKnowledge: Anti-Bot and Anti-Virus
SecureKnowledge: Threat Emulation
SecureKnowledge: Best Practices - Security Gateway Performance
SecureKnowledge: MultiCore Support for IPsec VPN in R80.10 and above
Download Center: R80.10 Next Generation Threat Prevention Platforms
Download Center: R77 Security Gateway Packet Flow
Download Center: R77 Security Gateway Architecture
Support Center: Check Point Security Gateway Architecture and Packet Flow
Checkmates: Check Point Threat Prevention Packet Flow and Architecture
Checkmates: fw monitor inspection point e or E
Infinity NGTP architecture
Security Gateway Packet Flow and Acceleration - with Diagrams
R80.x Security Gateway Architecture (Content Inspection)
| Questions and Answers |
|---|
Q: Why this diagram with SecureXL and CoreXL?
A: I dared to map both worlds of CoreXL and SecureXL in a diangram. This is only possible to a limited extent, as these are different technologies. It's really an impossible mission. Why!
- CoreXL is a mechanism to assign, balance and manage CPU cores. CoreXL SND makes a decision to "stick" particular connection going through to a specific FWK instance.
- SecureXL certain connections could avoid FW path partially (packet acceleration) or completely (acceleration with templates)
A: There are both technologies that play hand in hand. The two illustrations become problematic, e.g. in the Medium Path.
A: Here, the packet-oriented part (SecureXL) cannot be mapped with the connection-based part (CoreXL). Therefore, the following note from an new Check Point article from Valeri Loukine (Security Gateway Packet Flow and Acceleration - with Diagrams - 08-07-2018) and original article from Moti Sagey (Check Point Threat Prevention Packet Flow and Architecture - 04-25-2017) :
When Medium Path is available, TCP handshake is fully accelerated with SecureXL. Rulebase match is achieved for the first packet through an existing connection acceleration template. SYN-ACK and ACK packets are also fully accelerated. However, once data starts flowing, to stream it for Content Inspection, the packets will be now handled by a FWK instance. Any packets containing data will be sent to FWK for data extraction to build the data stream. RST, FIN and FIN-ACK packets once again are only handled by SecureXL as they do not contain any data that needs to be streamed.
A: To create an overview of both worlds with regard to the following innovations in R80.x:
- new fw monitor inspection points in R80 (e and E)
- new MultiCore VPN with dispatcher
- new UP Manager in R80
A: Since the logical flow in the overview differs from the real flow. For example, the medium path is only a single-logical representation of the real path. This was necessary to map all three paths (F2F, SXL, PXL) in one image. That is why the name "Logical Packet Flow".
A: I'm thinking about how to make the overview even better.
A: It was important for me that the right terms from Check Point were used. Many documents on the Internet use the terms incorrectly. Therefore I am grateful to everyone who still finds wording errors here.
A: This version has approved by Check Point representative, and we agreed that this should be the final version.
1.2a - article update to R80.20 (16.11.2018)
1.2b - update inspection points id, iD and more (19.11.2018)
1.2c - update maximal number of CoreXL IPv4 FW instances (20.11.2018)
1.2d - update R80.20 new functions (05.11.2018)
1.2e - bug fix (06.01.2019)
1.2f - update fw monitor inspection points ie/ IE (23.01.2019)
GA Version R80.10:
1.1b - final GA version (08.08.2018)
1.1c - change words to new R80 terms (08.08.2018)
1.1d - correct a mistak with SXL and "Accelerated path" (09.08.2018)
1.1e - bug fixed (29.08.2018)
1.1f - QoS (24.09.2018)
1.1g - correct a mistak in pdf (26.09.2018)
1.1h - add PSLXL and CPASXL path in R80.20 (27.09.2018)
1.1i - add "Medium Streaming Path" and "Inline Streaming Path" in R80.20 (28.09.2018)
1.1j - add "new R80.20 chain modules" (22.10.2018)
1.1k - bug fix chain modules (04.11.2018)
1.1l - add "chaptures" (10.11.2018)
1.1m - add R80.20 fw monitor inspection points "oe" and "OE" (17.12.2018)
1.0a - final version (28.07.2018)
1.0c - change colors (28.07.2018)
1.0d - add content inspection text (29.07.2018)
1.0e - add content inspection drawing (29.07.2018)
1.0f - update links (29.07.2018)
1.0g - update content inspection drawing flows and action (30.07.2018)
1.0h - change SecureXL flow (30.07.2018)
1.0i - correct SecureXL packet flow (01.08.2018)
1.0j - correct SecureXL names and correct "fw monitor inspection points" (02.08.2018)
1.0k - add new article "Security Gateway Packet Flow and Acceleration - with Diagrams" from 06.08.2018 to "References and links" (06.08.2018)
1.0l - add "Questions and Answers" (07.08.2018)
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